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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
(i) Nature of the case: 
This is a land use case involving the payment of a road impact fee. Appellants Karen 
White ("White") and Elkhorn, LLC ("Elkhorn") were the developers of White Cloud 
Subdivision ("White Cloud") located in Valley County, Idaho. After paying the impact fee for 
Phase I of White Cloud subdivision, pursuant to Valley County's implementation of a Capital 
Improvement Program ("CIP") and requirement that White enter into a Road Development 
Agreement ("RDA"), White filed this lawsuit seeking a declaration that the payment of the 
impact fee was an illegal tax and therefore the money White paid should be returned. 
(ii) Statement of Facts l : 
1. Road construction, improvement and maintenance In Valley County has 
traditionally been funded by the highway user fund from the State of Idaho and from timber 
receipts from timber harvested on federally owned land. (See Deposition of Gordon Cruickshank 
("Cruickshank Depo."), p. 32, 11. 10-17; C.R. p. 186. From time to time the County has also 
levied funds to purchase maintenance equipment. (Id. at p. 34, 11. 15-25; C.R. p. 187.) In 
addition, real estate developers have been "allowed" to provide "in-kind" construction to offset 
other costs. (Id. at p. 36, 11. 1-10; C.R. p. 187). 
2. When Valley County began to experience an increase in development during the 
past decade, it initiated what it called a Capital Improvements Program ("CIP"). (Id. at p. 36, 1. 
17 - p. 37, 1. 8.; C.R. p. 188). Valley County officially described the CIP in its March 2008 
Master Transportation Plan as: 
I The following Statement of Facts are taken from portions Plaintiff's Statement o/Material Facts found in the 
Clerks Record pp. 133-143 and other documents found in the Clerk's Record. The Clerk's Record and page 
number will be cited as "C.R p._" throughout this brief 
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E. Capital Improvement Program Process and Purpose 
Valley County has developed and adopted a Capital Improvement Program (CIP). 
The following description of the CIP is provided by Valley County: 
"In 2005, the Valley County Commissioners initiated a Road Development 
Agreement (RDA) process to require new developments to pay a fee to 
mitigate the impacts of their developments on the roads and bridges in Valley 
County. The RDA process replaced the Capital Contribution Agreements that 
were used by Valley County for larger developments that needed infrastructure 
improvements. The RDA requires all developers to pay a fee based on the 
number of trips their developments generate. Developers are, in effect, required 
to pay for the roadway capacity their developments use. The fee must be 
paid at the time of final plat. Credit is given for ROW required from the 
development and any in-lieu-of contributions, such as construction materials or 
developer sponsored construction of portions of roads and bridges. 
C.R. p. 308. 
3. Under the eIP, developers were required to pay a fee, construct in-kind 
improvements on existing roadways or dedicate rights-of-way in an amount calculated by the 
County's engineer to deal with impacts on county roads. (Id. at p. 41, 1. 7 - p. 42, 1. 18; c.R. p. 
149). The CIP, and calculations as to road impacts allegedly caused by new development, was 
completed by Valley County and its engineer between 2000 and 2005. (!d. at p. 43, 1. 6 - p. 45, 
1. 11; C.R. pp. 189-190). 
4. It is undisputed Valley County did not follow the Idaho Impact Fee Act 
("IDIF A") and the process required under IDIF A to charge developers impact fees for their 
development. c.R. p. 941. 
5. As the projects neared the point where approval of a final plat was necessary, the 
developer generally would pay a visit to Gordon Cruickshank, at the Valley County Road 
Department to discuss the Road Development Agreement and how it would be implemented. 
(Cruickshank Depo., at p. 49, 1. 12 - p. 50, 1. 5; C.R. p. 191) The actual Road Development 
Agreement was prepared by Valley County and its engineer; when the agreement was fmalized, 
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it was sent to the County Commissioners for approval. (Jd. at p. 50, 1. 6 - p. 52, 1. 6.; C.R. 191) 
The key component of the Road Development Agreement was the payment obligation based on 
Valley County's calculation of a monetary fee or whether the developer would undertake in-kind 
roadway construction. (Jd. at p. 53, 1. 11 - p. 54, 1. 17; C.R. 192). 
6. Approval of the Road Development Agreement occurred when the developer 
sought approval of the final plat and after all conditions of the preliminary plat were satisfied. 
(Jd. at p. 56, 11. 3-20; C.R. 192). 
7. Through her representative, Scott Findlay ("Findlay"), White, along with her 
father, Etter Usher, who is not a party to this case, submitted an application to Valley County on 
March 29, 2005, for a conditional use pennit ("CUP") to construct and develop a multi-phase 
residential subdivision in Valley County, Idaho known as White Cloud Subdivision ("White 
Cloud"). See Affidavit of Karen White in Support of Opposition to Motion for Summary 
Judgment ("Karen White Affidavit), ~ 5; C.R. p. 431; Affidavit of Scott Findlay in Support of 
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment ("Findlay Affidavit"), ~~ 3, 4, Ex. A; C.R. pp. 515 
and C.R. pp. 521-557. 
8. When Findlay filed the application for White Cloud on behalf of White in March 
2005, White had no expectation that White Cloud would create traffic impacts on existing 
roadways. In fact, the application explicitly stated that minimal impact was expected to 
roadways because the homes to be built within the development were primarily going to be 
second homes without full time occupants. Findlay Affidavit,~ 6, Ex. A; C.R. pp. 515-516. 
9. Also, during the initial application process, Valley County and its engineer had 
not even completed its CIP for the relevant area and identified what they calculated to be traffic 
impacts. Findlay Affidavit, ~ 8, Ex. D; C.R. p. 516 and C.R. p. 57l. Therefore, White had no 
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expectation at the time of the approval of her CUP application that a Road Development 
Agreement would entail a fee for road impacts nor was there a crp or calculation to even 
indicate what the fee might be. 
10. Valley County approved the CUP and preliminary plat for White Cloud on May 
12,2005, and the CUP was issued on May 24,2005. Findlay Affidavit, ~ 8, Ex. B; C.R. p. 516 
and C.R. p. 558. 
11. Condition No. 6 of the CUP states that: "A Development Agreement shall be 
required with the Board of County Commissioners." C.R. p. 559. 
12. Valley County provided a copy of its Road Development Agreement to Findlay 
for White to sign. Karen White Affidavit, ~ 10; C.R. p. 432; Findlay Affidavit, ~ 12; C.R. p. 
518. 
13. White signed the Road Development Agreement on June 26,2006, and the Valley 
County Commissioners signed it on July 24, 2006. C.R. pp. 448-451. The amount of the fee 
calculated under Valley County's crp for the North West Mountain area was One Hundred 
Sixty-Six Thousand Four Hundred Ninety-Six and noll 00 Dollars ($166,496.00). 
14. White later assigned her interests and obligations in Phase 2 of White Cloud to 
Elkhorn owned by White and her husband. Karen White Affidavit, ~ 3; C.R. 430. 
15. Elkhorn was in the process of developing Phase 2 of White Cloud when this 
lawsuit was filed a little over three year later on October 1,2009. C.R. p. 5. 
(iii) Course of Proceedings: 
White and Elkhorn filed their initial Complaint in the Federal District Court ofIdaho on 
October 1,2009. C.R. p. 5. An amended Complaint was filed on July 21,2010. c.R. pp. 22-23. 
Valley County answered on August 12,2010. C.R. p. 38. 
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Valley County filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on August 16,2010 arguing that 
White's Complaint should be dismissed based on: White's lack 0 f standing, failure to plead a 
right of action for the federal constitutional violations, the statute oflimitations had run on the 
inverse condemnation claims, ripeness, failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and White's 
payment of the illegal impact fee was voluntary. C.R. p. 44. White filed her Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant's Summary Judgment on October 8, 2010. C.R. p. 173. 
Federal Magistrate Judge Dale issued a Report & Recommendation on February 14, 2011 
denying in part and granting in part Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. C.R. p. 772. On 
September 30, 2011, Federal District Judge Lodge entered a Memorandum Order (C.R. p. 937) 
holding that White's state law inverse condemnation claims were not barred by the statute of 
limitations. C.R. p. 960. However, the court held that White's federal claims were barred by the 
applicable two year statute oflimitations. C.R. p. 952. Additionally, Judge Lodge held that the 
payment of monies under the RDA was not voluntary, and Valley County's attempt to 
characterize them as such appeared to be an "after the fact" attempt to create a defense to the 
imposition ofthe illegal impact fees. C.R. pp. 969-970. Judge Lodge also held that there were 
issues of material fact relating to exhausting administrative procedures, when White's state law 
claims became ripe, and Valley County's attempt for Rule 11 Sanctions failed. C.R. pp. 971-975. 
Both parties filed Motions for Summary Judgment on January 31,2012. C.R. p. 980 and 
C.R. p. 1003. On that same day Valley County filed a Motion to Certify Questions of Law to the 
Idaho Supreme Court which included four questions. C.R. p. 1016. On February 24,2012 White 
filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Valley County's Second Motion for Summary Judgment 
arguing that the plain language ofIDIFA and LUPA required Valley County to pass an impact 
fee ordinance prior to charging White. C.R. p. 1037. Additionally, White filed a Memorandum in 
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Opposition to Valley County's Motion to Certify Questions of Law to the Supreme Court. C.R. 
p. 1043. The only question Judge Lodge certified to the Idaho Supreme Court was: ''under Idaho 
law, when does the statute of limitations begin to run on a cause of action arising out ofan 
allegedly illegal tax imposed by a local government entity as part of a land use application?" 
c.R. p. 1101; Order Dckt. 151 filed with Idaho Supreme Court on August 24, 2012. 
CERTIFIED QUESTION OF LAW 
1. Under Idaho law, when does the statute of limitations begin to run on a cause of action 
arising out of an allegedly illegal impact fee imposed by a local government entity as part 
of a land use application? 
ARGUMENT 
I. The accrual for the statute of limitations on a cause of action seeking a refund of money 
collected through an illegal impact fee should start from the date the money was collected. 
In an action seeking a refund of money for an illegally collected impact fee, Idaho's four-
year statute of limitations, Idaho Code Section 5-224, should run from the date that the impact 
fee was collected. As discussed more fully below, a majority of state and federal district courts 
have held that the statute of limitations for a claim seeking a refund of an unauthorizedlillegal tax 
runs at the time of payment. The same standard should apply to an illegal impact fee since this 
Court in Idaho Building Contractors Association v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 126 Idaho 740, 890 
P.2d 326 (1995) recognized that, absent specific legislative authorization, the collection of an 
impact fee is in essence an unauthorized tax. 
"Statutes of limitations are statutes of repose, the object of which is to prevent fraudulent 
and stale actions from springing up after a great lapse of time. Billings v. Sisters of Mercy of 
Idaho, 86 Idaho 485,496,389 P.2d 224 (1964). "A statute of limitations begins to run when the 
party to be barred has the right to invoke the aid of the court to enforce his remedy." Sundance 
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Homes, Inc. v. County of DuPage, 746 N.E.2d 254 (Ill. 2001). In Sundance, the Illinois Supreme 
Court started the running of the statute oflimitations on an illegal impact fee claim at the date the 
claimant paid the fee. ld. at 262. In that case, Sundance Homes, Inc., a developer, sued DuPage 
County for a declaratory judgment to return the road impact fee it paid under the County's road 
impact fee ordinance after the enabling statute was determined unconstitutional under Illinois 
law. ld. at 257. The developer argued that its cause of action did not accrue until the Illinois 
Supreme Court ruled the enabling statute unconstitutional. ld. at 258. After reviewing the 
underlying legal policy for a statute of limitations and what events trigger a statute oflimitations, 
the court held that the event triggering the statute of limitations for a declaratory judgment claim 
to return payment of an illegal fee is the date the fee was paid. ld. at 262. 
Other courts have reached a similar conclusion as the Sundance court. In Wats Marketing 
of America v. Boehm, 242 Neb. 252,494 N.W.2d 527 (Neb, 1993), the Nebraska Supreme Court 
addressed whether the statute of limitations barred the refund of taxes paid after a state tax statute 
was determined to be illegal. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that "[t]he statute of 
limitations begins to run from the time the tax is paid, not from the time the illegality is judicially 
determined." ld. at 494 N.W.2d 527. This rule is consistent with the determinations made by 
other courts and appears to be the majority view with regard to when an illegal tax claim accrues 
for statute of limitations purposes. See e.g. Lowenberg v. Dallas, 168 S.W.3d 800, 802 (Tex. 
2005) (holding that a "fIre registration fee" was an illegal tax and the claim accrued on the date 
when the payment of the fee was made because it is the payment of the fee that causes the harm); 
Kuhn v. Department o/Revenue, 897 P.2d 792,797 (Colo. 1995) (holding that a claim to recover 
the payment of an illegal tax accrues when the tax is paid, independently of the claimant's 
knowledge of an injury); Paul v. City of Winsoocket, 745 A.2d 169, 171 (R.!. 2000) (fInding that 
a claim for the payment of an illegal water connection impact fee accrued, and the statute of 
APPELLPLNTS'BRlEF-7 
limitations accrued, as of the date the claimant paid the illegal fee because that was the date the 
claimant suffered an injury); Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association v. City of La Habra, 23 P.3d 
601, 602 (Cal. 2001) (concluding that a cause of action for payment of an illegal utility 
assessment accrued each time the fee was collected); Venture Coal Sales Company v. Us., 370 
F.3d 1102,1105 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (ruling that a claim for recovery of payment of an illegal sales 
tax accrued when payment for the sales tax was remitted). 
Courts have even recognized that the statute of limitations accrues at the time the illegal 
tax is paid even when the fee payer knows the tax being imposed is invalid but still chooses to 
pay. In Bainbridge v. Riverside County, 167 Cal.App.2d 418, 422, 334 P.2d 625, 627 (Cal.App. 
1959) a fee payer considered a license tax imposed by an ordinance illegal. The fee payer was 
also aware that a lawsuit challenging the ordinance was pending on appeal. Id. Despite the fee 
payer's recognition that the license tax ordinance was invalid, the fee payer paid the tax, doing so 
under protest. Id. The Bainbridge court could have determined that the fee payer's cause of 
action accrued when the fee payer knew they had to pay the tax but the court didn't. Instead, the 
court held "[i]n this action the right to commence proceedings to collect the tax illegally assessed 
and fine illegally imposed accrued upon payment of the last item in each instance." Id. 
The Bainbridge decision and the decisions from other courts cited above have similarities 
that go beyond dealing with an illegal tax and the issue of accrual. In all those cases, the fee 
payer's cause of action and the remedy sought involved a request for a refund of the monies paid. 
In this case, the answer to this certified question should be determined on the remedy being 
sought by White. Paragraph 18 of White's Second Amended Complaint seeks a return of the 
money White paid because the collection of the money was an unauthorized tax. See. CR, pg. 4. 
It follows that a cause of action seeking a refund of an illegal tax cannot accrue until the tax has 
been collected because: (1) the claim would not be ripe and (2) not all the elements for the refund 
(i.e. damages) exist. 
APPELLPJNTS'BRIEF-8 
Ripeness is a fundamental prerequisite to invoke a Court's jurisdiction-a harm must be 
sufficiently matured to warrant judicial intervention. Mannos v. Moss, 143 Idaho 927, 936, 155 
P.3d 1166,1175(2007) (citing Noh v. Cenarrusa, 137 Idaho 798, 801, 53 P.3d 1217, 1220 
(2002)). The central concern of the ripeness doctrine is whether the case involves uncertain or 
contingent future events that mayor may not occur as anticipated or, indeed, may not occur at 
all. See Lewis v. Cont'l Bank COlp., 494 U.S. 472, 479-80, 110 S.Ct. 1249, 108 L.Ed.2d 400 
(1990). Here, White's request for a refund would not be ripe until White paid the illegal tax. 
The County maintains that the accrual date should be the date the CUP was granted because at 
that time it was 'apparent' White would be required to pay some amount. Although White 
would have had a legal injury at the time the CUP was granted, her legal injury at that time 
would have only sustained a cause of action for whether the conditioning of CUP approval on the 
payment of an impact fee was legal or illegal. White's claim for a refund based on her payment 
of the illegal impact fee is a separate injury and calls for a different remedy that did not accrue 
until the illegal tax was paid. Had White filed a claim for a refund of a potential future payment 
of the illegal fee, White's refund claim would not only be unripe but White would also have not 
known what the refund amount would be because the fee amount had not been calculated by the 
County's engineer at the time of the CUP. See. Letter from Valley County Engineer attached to 
Affidavit of Scott Findlay Exhibit D; CR. p. 572. 
Similarly, White's cause of action seeking a refund could not accrue until all the elements 
for her cause of action were present including suffering a damage or injury from the collection of 
the illegal tax. "[T]he test to determine when a cause of action arises is when the plaintiff has 
suffered a legal injury, that is, when he or she has the right to maintain an action or first may 
maintain an action to a successful conclusion, or when the action can be brought without being 
subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim." 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions § 127. 
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This Court has held that that a statute of limitation does not accrue until damages are incurred: 
" ... we have never held that a statute of limitations may run before an aggrieved party suffers 
damages. The authority to do so is highly doubtful, since it is axiomatic that a party has no right 
to sue for damages until actual injury occurs." Corbridge v. Clark Equip. Co., 112 Idaho 85, 88-
89, 730 P.2d 1005, 1008-09 (1986). With respect to White's illegal tax claim seeking a refund of 
the money White paid, there was no injury or damage giving rise to her refund claim until the 
money was collected. 
Based on the legal analysis above, White respectfully asks this Court to join the majority 
view by holding that the statute of limitations begins to run on a cause of action seeking a refund 
from an illegal impact fee imposed by a local government entity as part of a land use application 
at the time the impact fee is collected. Setting the accrual date for an illegal impact fee on the 
date the illegal fee is paid provides a date certain that comports with the legal requirement that an 
injury has not occurred, and is ripe for review. 
II. This Court should not adopt the minority view that the statute of limitations on a cause 
of action seeking a refund of money collected through an illegal impact fee should start 
when the fees are imposed. 
Judge Lodge recognized in his August 10,2012 Order, that a minority of courts start the 
statute oflimitations at the time the fee is imposed. In particular Judge Lodge cited two cases 
from the minority view namely Fredrick v. Northern Palm Beach County Improvement District, 
971 So.2d 974 (Fla. App. 2008) and Pondersosa Homes, Inc. v. City of San Ramon, 29 Cal. Rptr. 
26,27 (Cal. App. 1994). Based on the discussion below, this Court should not adopt the 
minority view. 
In Pondersosa Homes, Inc. v. City of San Ramon, 29 Cal. Rptr. 26 (Cal. App. 1994), the 
plaintiff filed a complaint against the city challenging a traffic mitigation fee that was imposed as 
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a condition for a tentative subdivision map approval. Id. at 27. On appeal, the Ponderosa court 
stated that "[ t ]he key question, therefore, is whether the' imposition 0 f fees' in this case occurred 
when the City first set the traffic mitigation fees as a condition on its tentative subdivision map 
approval, or when [the plaintiff] paid an installment on the fees." Id. at 30. It is important to note 
however that the Ponderosa court's analysis was not addressing when the statute of limitations 
runs, but rather was addressing for the most part, when a ISO-day period set forth in a California 
statute began to run which allowed a fee payer to challenge the imposition of a fee. 2 
Specifically, the Pondersa court looked at Section 66020 of the California statutes which 
governed "Protests against the imposition of fees, dedications or other exactions by a local 
agency on a residential housing development." Id at 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 26, 29. According to 
Section 66020 a fee payer " .... may protest the imposition of any fees, dedications, reservations 
or other exactions imposed ... " Id. /n. 1 (underlining added). Interpreting the phrase imposition 
of fees, the Ponderosa court held that the ISO-day period ran when the fee was imposed rather 
than when it was paid reasoning: 
The statutory definition of "imposition of fees" does not contradict this [court's] 
interpretation. Section 66020, subdivision (h) states that "imposition of fees, dedications, 
reservations, or other exactions occurs ... when they are imposed or levied on a specific 
development." The statute does not say that imposition occurs "when they are paid or 
complied with." 
Id. at 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 26, 30 - 31. 
In this case, Idaho has no statute equivalent to California's Section 66020. That statute is 
unique to the State of California and does not provide a legitimate basis for this Court to create 
Idaho case law on the issue of accrual. Unlike the ripeness and injury considerations this Court 
is being asked to consider by White for fixing accrual at the time the fee is paid, the California 
2 After its analysis of the state statute, the Ponderosa court did however apply the same triggering event to the fee 
payer's § 1983 claim relative to the running of the statute of limitations. See. 29 Cal.Rptr. 26, 31. 
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law on this issue has been legislatively preempted in this area. Thus, the Ponderosa court's 
statutory interpretation does not assist this Court in deciding why, if at all, the date of accrual 
should start when an illegal tax is imposed as the minority view so holds. 
The second case cited by Judge Lodge was Fredrick v. Northern Palm Beach County 
Improvement District, 971 So.2d 974 (Fla. App. 2008). In that case, homeowners were 
challenging the validity of property assessments and impact fees that were used to pay for an 
expansion of a street because they did not have notice of the exclusive nature of the fees. The 
homeowners' action was brought fourteen years after the District, acting pursuant to their 
authority, authorized the fees. Id. at 971 So.2d 980. The county argued that the four-year statute 
of limitations had run at the time the fees were imposed. Quoting an earlier Florida state court 
case, the Frederick court held "that there was little authority to support a determination as to 
'when a cause of action on a wrongful municipal special assessment accrues for purposes of the 
running of the statute of limitations. '" Id. at 971 So.2d 978-79 (quoting Keenan v. City of 
Edgewater, 684 So. 2d 226, 227 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)). The Frederick court noted that the 
earlier case found ''that the city has a need for certainty in its economic affairs, and that its policy 
decisions should not be SUbjected to perennial review." Id. at 979. Based upon the above policy 
consideration, and with very little analysis beyond that, the Frederick court agreed with the 
earlier court's holding that ''the statute of limitations begins to accrue either from the date the 
assessments are created or from the date the city approved . . . them." Id. (quotation marks 
omitted). dkt. 151, p. 17 
In this case, the Frederick court holding should not be adopted because that holding goes 
too far and immunizes local government from Idaho state statutes intended to cover the entire 
field of regulation. For example, there is no dispute that IDIF A is a broad regulatory program 
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governing the imposition of impact fees. If the statute of limitations runs when the assessment is 
created, as in Frederick, it would be patently unfair to future land use applicants to prevent them 
from challenging the imposition of an illegal impact fee merely because the application was 
submitted four years after the assessment was adopted by the local governmental entity. Thus, 
all cities and counties would have to do to circumvent the requirements of IDIFA is to collect 
illegal impact fees, and hope that no one challenges that practice for four years. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the analysis above, White respectfully requests that this Court provide the 
answer to the certified question as: the statute of limitations begins to run on a cause of action 
arising out of an allegedly illegal impact fee imposed by a local government entity as part of a 
land use application at the time the illegal impact fee is paid. 
DATED this 22nd day ofJuly, 2013. 
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